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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ZEBLEN

v.

WHITE, et al.,
PlaintiffsAppellants,
vs.

Case No. 16266

INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH
CARE, INC., et al.,
DefendantsRespondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action by Zeblen V. White, an incompetent,
by and through his guardian ad litem and natural daughter,
Dorene Zundel, for damages for personal injuries suffered
as a result of the medical malpractice of Defendants and
Respondents.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Court below granted a Judgment of Dismissal and
Summary Judgment in favor of the Defendants-Respondents.

The

judgments were based upon the lower court's finding that
Plaintiff-Appellant's claim and cause of action were barred
by the statute of limitations.

(R. 86,87)
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-Appellant seeks to vacate the judgments
granted by the Court below and have this action remanded for
trial on the merits.
STATEViENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff Zeblen V. White is an incompetent residing
in Box Elder County, State of Utah, and appears in this action
through his duly appointed guardian ad litem, Dorene Zundel,
his natural daughter.

(R. 9-13)

Defendants, Intermountain

Health Care, Inc. and The Health Services Corporation of the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints are corporations
organized and existing under the laws of the State of Utah,
and at all times material hereto said Defendants were the
owners of and engaged in managing and operating the McKay-Dee
Hospital, hereinafter referred to as the "Hospital", in Ogden,
Utah, for the care and treatment of patients.
Dr. Peter

s.

The Defendant,

Quintero was at all times material hereto a

physician licensed to practice and practicing medicine in the
State of Utah.

(R. 2, 3, 15, 16 and 26)

On April 15, 1975, Plaintiff was admitted to the
Hospital for medical care and treatment.

On or about the

18th day of April, 1975, and thereafter, while Plaintiff was
confined in said Hospital as a patient and under the treatment
and care of said Defendants, Plaintiff sustained injuries and
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damages which were proximately caused by the negligent acts
and omissions of the Defendants.

(R. 305)

Plaintiff further

claims that he did not give his informed consent to the particular procedures recommended by the Defendants and would
not have consented had the dangers and hazards thereof been
made known to him.

(R. 5, 6)

On the 18th day of April, 1977, an action was filed
in the lower court by the above-named Plaintiff against the
above-named Defendants and another Defendant, to-wit:

Dr.

John M. Bender, Civil No. 241935, wherein substantially the
same relief was sought as is sought in this action.

Said

action failed otherwise than upon the merits on the 13th day
of January, 1978, when it was dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Rule 41 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(R.

3, 16, 27)

On the 17th day of' January, 1978, an action was filed
in the lower court by the above-named Plaintiff against the
above-named Defendants, Civil No. C-78-297, wherein the
same relief was sought as that which is sought in this
action.

A motion was filed by the Defendants to dismiss

said action on the grounds that the claims set forth
therein were barred by the pertinent statute of limitations.

Said motion was, on the 15th day of March, 1978,

denied on the grounds that the Plaintiff filed that action
within one year after the voluntary dismissal of Civil action
No. 241935, as aforesaid, and said action was, therefore,
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timely filed under the provisions of §78-12-40, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, as amended.

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss

said action on the grounds that Plaintiff failed to file a
Notice of Intent to Commence Action pursuant to the provisions of §78-14-8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended,
was granted on the 15th day of March, 1978, without prejudice to Plaintiff's right to refile after complying with
the requirements of said section.

(R. 2, 3, 16, 27)

On the 4th day of May, 1978, Notice of Intent to
Commence Legal Action against the Defendants above named
was served on the Defendants, The Health Services Corporation of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints
and Intermountain Health Care, Inc., and on the 5th day
of May, 1978, said Notice was served upon Dr. Peter S.
Quintero, all pursuant to order of the court, as aforesaid,
and §78-14-8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended; none
of the Defendants responded to said Notice.

(R. 4, 16, 28)

On Speternber 28, 1978, Plaintiff filed a third Complaint, Civil No. C-78-6121, wherein the same relief was
sought as that which was sought in the previous actions.
(R. 1)

Defendants, on November 20, 1978, filed Motions

for Summary Judgment.

(R. 24, 33)

These Motions were

argued before the Honorable Bryant H. Croft on November 30,
1978.

(R. 31, 34, 82)

Relying primarily on the case of
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Vealey v. Clegg, 579 P.2d 919 (Utah 1978), the lower court
granted the Defendants' Motions and entered Summary Judgment and Judgment of Dismissal in favor of the Defendants
on December 21, 1978.

(R. 83, 86, 87)

On January 2,

1979, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Order Amending Judgment of Dismissal and Summary Judgment (R. 90), which
Motion was argued on January 16, 1979 (R. 96, 110) and
denied by the lower court on Order entered January 25, 1979.
(R. 110)
On January 22, 1979, Plaintiff filed his Notice of
Appeal.

(R. 106)

In March of 1979, the intention of the

Utah State Legislature that §78-14-8 of the Health Care
Act not be applied retroactively was confirmed by the adoption of amendments to that section.
Plaintiff-Appellant White was, at the time this
cause of action accrued, mentally incompetent, and no legal
guardian was appointed for him until the 28th day of Septemher, 1978, the date on which Dorene Zundel was appointed
as guardian ad litem for the purpose of these proceedings.
(R. 9, 13, 93, 94)
POINT I
THE NOTICE REQUIREMENT OF §78-14-8 IS TO BE
APPLIED ONLY TO CAUSES OF ACTION ARISING
AFTER APRIL 1, 1976.
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A.

THE RECENT AMENDMENTS TO UTAH CODE ANNOTATED,
1953, UTAH HEALTH CARE MALPRACTICE ACT, ARE
DETERl1INATIVE IN THE CASE AT BAR OF THE ISSUE
OF NOTICE.

In March of 1979, the Utah State Legislature passed
House Bill 164, which bill was subsequently signed into law
by Governor Matheson and became effective on the 8th day of
May, 1979.

This bill amends Utah Code Annotated §78-14-8,

as follows:
78-14-8. No malpractice action against a
health care provider may be [ee!!lJTlefteea] initiated
unless and until the plaintiff gives the prospective defendant or his executor or successor, at
least ninety days' prior notice of intent to
commence an action. Such notice shall include
a general statement of the nature of the claim,
the persons involved, the date, time and place
of the occurrence, the circumstances thereof,
specific allegations of misconduct on the part
of the prospective defendant, the nature of the
alleged injuries and other damages sustained.
Notice may be in letter or affidavit form
executed by the plaintiff [afte] or his attorney.
Service shall be accomplished by-Persons
authorized and in the manner prescribed by the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for the service
of the summons and complaint in a civil action
or by certified mail, return receipt requested,
in which case notice shall be deemed to have
been served on the date of mailing.
Such
notice shall be served within the time allowed
for commencing a malpractice action against a
health care provider.
If the notice is served
less than ninety days prior to the expiration
of the applicable time period, the time for
commencing the malpractice action against the
health care provider shall be extended to
[ft±fte~y] 120 days from the date of service of
notice.
This section shall, for purposes of determining its retroactivity, not be construed as
relating to the limitation on the time for
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coll\filencing any action, and shall apply only to
causes of action arising on or after April 1,
1976. This section shall not apply to third
party actions, counterclaims or crossclaims
against a health care provider.
(The underlined portions were added, the bracketed
portions deleted by the amendment.)
The sub-issue at this point is whether the amendment
to §78-14-8, is to be applied retroactively; is it to apply
to cases pending on appeal?

There are two avenues for

argument under the facts of the present case but both lead
to the same result.
1.

Is a new legislative enactment applicable to a

pending appeal if it effects only matters of practice and
procedure?

The answer to this is clearly, yes.

In the case of Petty v. Clark, 113 Utah 205, 192
P.2d 589 (1948), this Court reversed a trial courts ruling
because the Judge had used the jury's findings in a foreclosure
action in an advisory capacity only.

The case was remanded

for rehearing as there was at that time no law allowing the
jury to be used only in an advisory capacity in these type
of actions.

However, before the matter was reheard the

legislature changed the law so as to allow the jury to be
used in an advisory role in such actions.

The lower court

again used the jury's findings as merely being advisory and
ruled for the plaintiff.

The defendant appealed arguing

that new law should not be applied to a pending case.

In

rejecting the defendant's argument and affirming the decision this Court cited Boucofski v. Jacobsen, 36 Utah 165
104 P. 117

(1909), which held:
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"While it is true that a party's rights
in a judgr:ient, as a general rule, may not
be affected by legislative acts passed or
which become effective after the entry of
judgment, the rule does not apply to laws
which are merely remedial, and which only
effect matters of procedure and practice."
This Court further stated on page 394 of the Petty
case, in rejecting the defendant's contention that the
appellate court was bound by its previous decisions (law of
the case):
But the law of the case doctrine does not
apply to a case where the policy of the
law has been changed in the meantime by
a legislative enactment, in a case where
the amended provision deals only with
procedure rather than making a change in
substantive law.
In holding that pending actions will be governed by
newly enacted statutory provisions dealing

1'1 ith

matters of

procedure and practice, Utah joined with the majority of her
sister states who have ruled on this point.
In 111 A.L.R. at page 1334, it states:
"Although in some cases involving questions
of evidence and practice, a contrary conclusion has been reached . . . it is quite
generally assumed that the appellate court
will determine questions of practice and
evidence according to the law prevailing
at the time of its decision on appeal, and
not the time the judgment appealed from is
rendered."
(Citations omitted.)
In the case of Denison v. Goforth, 454 P.2d 218,
(Wash. 1969), the Washington Supreme Court reversed a summary judgment entered by a lower court dismissing a malpracti
suit based upon a case which it (Washington Supreme Court)
decided during the period after the Denison case had been
argued but before the decision was handed down.

The issue
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dealt with the appropriate time from which the statute of
limitations should run.

Had the court decided Denison

under the law v;hich existed at the time it was heard in the
lower courts or even as of the time arguments were heard
on appeal, it would have had to affirm the summary judgment.
Instead it followed the most recent law available and reversed
the summary judgment with leave for all parties to amend
their pleadings and advance to trial.
The pertinent question then becomes whether the amendment as adopted by the legislature is procedural.
it is.

Clearly

The entirety of §78-14-8 deals with the notice require-

ment, when and how it is to be given, and for what causes of
action it applies.

The notice requirement is a legislatively

established pre-requisite to a party-plaintiff proceeding
with his common law cause of action.

It neither creates nor

destroys a substantive nor a vested right.
In §78-14-2 of the Act, the legislature states,
• it is the purpose of the legislature to provide a
reasonable time in which actions may be commenced against
health care providers • • • and to provide other procedural
changes to expedite early evaluation and settlement of claims."
(Emphasis added.)

This Court also states in Vealey, supra,

page 920, that limitation and notice requirements are procedural matters.
No substantive rights are created, vested or severed
by this amendment; it is purely procedural in nature.

Thus,
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it is applicable to the pending action.

Therefore, neither

is the notice requirement to be applied retroactively, nor
are the provisions of §78-14-8 to be "construed as relating
to the limitation on the time for commencing an action."
2.

May a new legislative

enactn~nt

or change in the
a~d

law (not just those effecting only practice

procedure)

be applied by the court to a pending appeal to aid it in
the proper interpretation and application of existing law?
Again, the answer clearly is, yes.

As expressed in

Okland Construction Company v. Industrial Commission, 520
P.2d 208,

(Utah 1974),

"It is a widely accepted principle that where
a statutory amend~ent deals only with clarification and amplification as to how the law
should have been understood prior to its
enactment, such amendment and the correct
interpretation should be given retroactive
application."
We are not in this case dealing with the situation
where there is a change in the law interjected into the
legal structure pending an action on appeal.

Instead, we

are clearly dealing with the situation where a statutory
amendment clarifies and amplifies how the law should have
been understood prior to its enactment.

We are not dealing

with retrospective application of an amendment extending
the period of limitations as was the case in Ireland v.
MacKintosh, 22 Utah 296, 61 P. 901 (1900), and Greenhalgh v.
Payson City, 530 P.2d 799,

(Utah 1975).
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Neither are we dealing in this case with the situation where a final judgment has been entered.

Had this

Court already ruled on this particular case, it is concededly
doubtful whether a subsequent change in the law or a clarification of the law could effect it.

(See Boucofski, supra.)

But, here there is of yet no final judgment; the matter is
pending.
As the case at bar presents a situation where the
amendments do not change existing law but merely clarify
and correct errors made in its previous interpretation and
application, and there is no prior entry of final judgment
herein, the newly enacted amendments are applicable and
determinative herein as to the issue of retroactivity of the
notice requirement.

Therefore, whether applying the amend-

ment directly or merely using it to get a proper interpretation and application of §78-14-8, the result is the same.
Said section is not to be applied to causes of action arising
prior to April 1, 1976.

Also, as per the amendment, neither

can the provisions of §78-14-8 be construed as "relating
to the limtation on time for commencing an action" as that
phrase is used in §78-14-11.
As Plaintiff-Appellant's cause of action arose in
April of 1975, he was not obligated to give a Notice of
Intent to Commence Suit.

To hold otherwise would be directly

contrary to the clearly expressed intent of the legislature.
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B.

EVEN IF THE AMENDMENT IS NOT FOUND TO BE
DETERMINATIVE OF THE NOTICE ISSUE, THE
INTENT OF THE LEGISLATURE IN THE ORIGINALLY
ADOPTED SECTION IS CLEAR.

Utah Code Annotated, 1953, §68-3-3, provides, "No
part of these revised statutes is retroactive, unless expressly
so declared."
Board,

(See also McCarrey v. Utah Teachers Retirement

111 Utah 251, 177 P.2d 725,

Electric Company, 546 P.2d 896,

(1947); Shupe v. Wasatch

(Utah 1976).)

73 Arn. Jur.

2d, STATUTES, §350, p. 487, states:
The question whether a statute operates retrospectively or prospectively only, is one of
legislative intent.
In determining such intent,
courts observe a strict rule of construction
against retrospective operation, and indulge
in the presumption that the legislature intended
statutes, or amendments thereof enacted by it,
to operate prospectively only, and not retroactively.
However, a contrary determination
will be made where the intention of the legislature to make the statute retroactive is stated
in express terms, or is clearly, explicitly,
positively, unequivocally, unmistakably and
unambiguously shown by necessary implication or
by terms which permit no other meaning to be
annexed to them, and which preclude all question
in regard thereto, and leave no reasonable doubt
thereof.
(Emphasis added.)
By its express terms, the only section of the Utah
Health Care Malpractice Act, as originally adopted, to be
applied retroactively is §78-14-4.

This is clear by the terms

of §78-14-4(2), "The provisions of this section
apply retroactively .

. shall

Also, by the terms of §78-14-11:

Act not retroactive - Exception - The provisions
of this Act, with the exception of the provisions
relating to the limitation on the time for commencing an action, shall not apply to injuries,
death or services rendered which occurred prior
to the effective date of this Act [April 1, 1976).
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Respondents and others in similar positions have
argued that §78-14-8, which sets forth the requirement of
serving a Notice of Intent to Commence Action, is a provision
"relating to the limitation on the time for commencing
action," and, thus, should be applied retroactively pursuant
to §78-14-11, above quoted.

This is an erroneous construc-

tion of the statute and an improper application of the existing law as is clear from an application of the rules of construction as discussed below and from the amendment to
§78-14-8.
In determining whether an enactment is to be applied
retroactively, the legislative intent is paramount.

There

exists a "strict rule of construction against retrospective
operation."

The legislature overcomes the rule of construc-

tion only by a "clearly,

e~plicitly,

positively, unequivocally,

unmistakably, and unambiguously" shown intention.

This may

be by implication, but the terms of the statute must "permit
no other meaning .

preclude all question in

and

regard thereto and leave no reasonable doubt" as to the
intent.

73 Am. Jur. 2d, STATUTES, supra.
The Utah legislature was apparently very conscious

of these limits on the retroactivity of newly passed statutes,
It went to the effort of setting forth in §78-14-4 that:
"The provisions of this section .
actively • •

"

• • shall apply retro-

(Emphasis added.)

No other section of this

Act contains such a statement except §78...J.4-llr whtch..
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expressly refers to those "provisions relating to the limitation on the time for commencing an action."

(Emphasis added.)

Had the legislature intended any other section of this Act
to be applied retroactively, it could and undoubtedly would
have made this intent as clear in the other section(s) as
it did in §78-14-4.

Also, the legislature used the word

"provisions" both in §78-14-4 and §78-14-11 with respect
to the "provisions" which were to be given retroactive effect.
Although it is not conclusive that "provisions" in §78-14-11
refers to the same "provisions" referred to in §78-14-4, it
is some indication of the legislature's intent.
Thus, by straight forward application of the rule of
construction against retroactivity, the presumption that
statutes are to apply only prospectively and the fact that
there is no clear, unmistakable or unambiguous intent shown
that §78-14-8 be applied other than prospectively, it cannot
be construed to be retroactively applicable.

Furthermore,

to be applied retroactively, the statute must by its terms
"permit no other meaning;" it must leave "no reasonable
doubt" as to the intent of the legislature.

Obviously, this

statute does "permit meanings" other than that it be retroactively applied.

In fact, its most plain and logical mean-

ing is that it is for prospective application only.

So in

the very least, there is a reasonable doubt as to whether
§78-14-8 is to be applied retroactively.

This, coupled with

the above discussion, especially the rule of strict construction against retroactivity, is sufficient to defeat any claim
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Respondents may have with regard to the retroactive applicability of the §78-14-8.
C.

VEALEY V. CLEGG, SHOULD BE OVERRULED
OR CLARIFIED.

Some have interpreted the Vealey case as meaning that
§78-14-8 is to be applied retroactively, to actions occurring
prior to April 1, 1976.

The language of the opinion is,

however, unclear and ambiguous.

Based upon the preceding

discussion, it is clear that the Court erred if it intended
the rectroactive application of the notice section.

Further,

Plaintiff-Appellant herein agrees with and endorses the
arguments and discussions in plaintiff-appellant Cleghorn's
brief in the sister case, No. 16329, which has been consolidated with the case herein for purposes of this appeal.
To avoid repetition, Plaintiff-Appellant White herein
will not recite the arguments presented by Cleghorn in his
brief in this regard.

Instead, the Court is referred to

pages 9 through 13 of said brief.

Suffice it here to say

that it appears the Court, in all due respect, misconstrued
the phrase "expiration of the applicable time period" as
used in §78-14-8.

(See Vealey, supra. p. 920.)

If the Court

did not interpret this phrase to mean the "effective date"
of the statute, i.e., April 1, 1976, the opinion is ambiguous
and needs to be clarified.

If the Court did interpret the

above phrase to mean and be limited to the "effective date"
of the statute, such interpretation is clearly erroneous and
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must be reversed.

(See also appellant McGuire's brief in

Case No. 151984, also consolidated herewith for hearing,
pages 6 through 13.)
Plaintiff-Appellant White, at this point, would only
remind the Court as to that which Chief Justice Crockett
so cogently states in State v. Kelbach, 569 P.2d 1100,

(Utah

1977):
As a general proposition, the law as established
should remain so until changed by the legislature, whose prerogative it is to make and to change
the law.
This does not mean to say that where
there is judgment-made law, which is later
observed to be clearly in error, that such error
should be so cast in cement that it cannot be
remedied.
In such circumstances, the court
undoubtedly can and should correct it.
(Id. at
1102)
POINT II
§78-14-8 VIOLATES THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE
I §24 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH.
Article I, Section 24 of the Constitution of Utah
states:
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform
operation
This provision is, in effect, Utah's guarantee to equal
protection under the law,
United States Constitution.

paralleling Amendment XIV of the
This Court has consistently

held that an act is unconstitutional if it, without "reasonable basis," treats one group of persons differently from
another group similarly situated.

Leetham v. McGinn, 524
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P.2d 323,

(Utah 1974); Hansen v. Public Employee's Retire-

ment System Board of Administration, 122 Utah 44, 246 P.2d
591 (1952); Gronlund v. Salt Lake City, 113 Utah 284, 194 P.2d
464

(1948).
The U. S. Supreme Court likewise adopts a "rational

basis" test in cases dealing with alleged violations of the
guarantee of equal protection, except those dealing with fundamental rights or suspect classes (primarily First Amendment
rights) in which cases it applies a compelling state interest
test.

McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-426, 81 S. Ct.

1101, 1105, 6 L.Ed. 2d 393 (1961).
Is there a rational basis to distinguish between plaintiffs in medical malpractice cases and plaintiffs in other
personal injury cases, and particularly from plaintiffs in
other professional malpractice actions?

Why should a plain-

tiff in a medical malpractice case be required to file a
Notice of Intent to Commence Action when other similarly
situated plaintiffs are not required to so do?
Although no exact statistical study has been done,
the Court should take judicial notice that legal actions,
particularly personal injury and all professional malpractice
actions, have increased significantly over the past decade.
This applies both as to the number of suits filed and the
amount of damages sought and recovered.
litigation conscious.

The public has grown

Individuals want recovery for every

alleged wrong or injury inflicted on them.

The courts have
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become the avenue for them to obtain their recoveries.
The Utah legislature set forth the purpose of the Utah
Health Care Malpractice Act in §78-14-2:
Legislative findings and declarations--Purpose
of act.
The legislature finds and declares that
the number of suits and claims for damages and
the amount of judgments and settlements arising
from health care has increased greatly in recent
years. Because of these increases the insurance
industry has substantially increased the cost of
medical malpractice insurance. The effect of
increased premiurr.s and increased claims is
increased care cost, both through the health
care providers passing the cost of premiums to
the patient and through the provider's practicing
defensive medicine because he views a patient as
a potential adversary in a lawsuit. Further,
certain health care providers are discouraged
from continuing to provide services because of
the high cost and possible unavailability of
malpractice insurance.
In view of these recent trends and with the intention of alleviating the adverse effects which
these trends are producing in the public's health
care system, it is necessary to protect the public
interest by enacting measures designed to encourage
private insurance companies to continue to provide
health-related malpractice insurance while at the
same time establishing a mechanism to ensure the
availability of insurance in the event that it
becomes unavailable from private companies.
In enacting this act, it is the purpose of the
legislature to provide a reasonable time in which
actions may be commenced against health care providers while limiting that time to a specific
period for which professional liability insurance
premiums can be reasonably and accurately calculated; and to provide other procedural changes
to expedite early evaluation and settlement of
claims.
The legislature finds that there is an increase in
the number of suits and claims for damages and in the amount
of judgments and settlements.

As a result, insurance
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premiums have increased, which costs have been passed on to
the public.

It finds that this has resulted in "providers

[of health care] practicing defensive medicine," and that
"providers are discouraged from continuing to provide
services because of the high cost and possible unavailability
of malpractice insurance."
Plaintiff-Appellant contends that this is no different
from other professions supplying services to the public.
Any attorney who has recently looked at the increased premiums he or she must pay for legal malpractice insurance faces
the same situation as the health care providers.

Insurance

premiums have substantially increased in cost, and they,
like the cost in the medical profession, are passed on to the
public.

These costs are also so significantly high as to

cause some attorneys to "go bare" and discourage others from
continuing to provide legal services.
Likewise, attorneys and other professionals also must
practice "defensively" just as drivers of vehicles must practice
"defensive driving."
implied duty to do so.

There is no burden in this but rather an
Health care providers should not be

exempt from this duty of practicing defensively, nor is such
a duty unique to them.

Health care providers are simply in

no different position than other providers of professional
services.
There exists, therefore, no rational basis for distinguishing between plaintiffs in medical malpractice actions
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and plaintiffs in other professional malpractice actions.
It cannot realistically be argued that plaintiffs in medical
malpractice actions are more frivolous and less reasonable
than plaintiffs in other professional malpractice actions.
In addition to there being required a "reasonable
basis" for a differentiation to be constitutional, the
"reasonable basis" must be related to the purposes to be
accomplished by the act.

Abrahamsen v. Bd. of Review of

Industrial Commission of Utah, 3 Utah 2d 289, 283 P.2d 213
(1955); Leetham, supra.; Hansen, supra.

Chief Justice

Berger states that " . . . the Equal Protection Clause does
enable us to strike down discriminatory law • .

. where

the classification is justified by no legitimate state
interest, compelling or otherwise."

Weber v. Aetna Casualty

& Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 92 S. Ct. 1406, 31 L.Ed 2d 768
(1972).

The purposes (i.e., the state interest) sought to

be accomplished by this act are set forth in the third paragraph of §78-14-2 as quoted above.

This in effect pre-supposes

that the present notice requirement will reduce the number
and amounts sought in medical malpractice cases.

Were this

true, and there is absolutely no indication that it is, why
not require such notice in all other cases?
There does not appear by statistic or logic any indication that the 90-day notice period will expedite early
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evaluation and settlement of claims.
site is true.

If anything, the oppo-

The notice requirement gives the provider an

additional 90 days to sit on the claim and, if he is of the
nature to do so, destroy or otherwise make unavailable
records which may be critical to the case.

Also, the pro-

vider may hide his assets or leave the jurisdiction, thus
jeopardizing the plaintiff's position.

A suit filed with

the court would also be more motivation for a provider to
promptly evaluate and settle a claim and would protect the
just causes of action of the injured plaintiff.
Defendant-Appellants have argued that other courts
have upheld pre-suit procedural requirements.

This is true,

but most, if not all, of these deal with some type of mandatory arbitration and/or pre-submission of claims to a medical
panel.

Eastin v. Broomfield, 570 P.2d 744 (Ariz. 1977);

State v. Ex. Rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 261 N.W. 2d 442
(Wisc. 1978).

And even these statutes providing for arbitra-

tion are not upheld by all courts.

As stated in Graley v.

Satayatham, 343 N.E. 2d at 837 (Ohio 1972), speaking of
special requirements for medical malpractice actions:
There is no satisfactory reason for this separate
and unequal treatment. There obviously is 'no
compelling governmental interst' unless it be
argued that any segment of the public in financial
distress be at least partly relieved of financial
accountability for its negligence. To articulate
the requirement is to demonstrate its absurdity,
for at one time or another every type of profession or business undergoes difficult times, and
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it is not the business of government to manipulate the law so as to provide succor to one
class, the medical, by depriving another, the
malpracticed patients, of the equal protection
mandated by the constitution. Even remaining
within the area of the professions, it is
notable that the special consideration given
to the medical profession by these statutes
is not given to lawyers or dentists or others
who are subject to malpractice suits.
Additionally, assuming a valid legislative
purpose to enact laws relating to protection
of the public's health, this legislation may
be counter-productive. The extending of special
litigation benefits to the medical profession
certainly cannot be considered as relating to
protection of the public health. On the contrary, the quality of health care may actually
decline.
To the extent that in tort actions of
the malpractice type if the medical profession
is less accountable than formerly, relaxation
of medical standards may occur with the public
the victim.
Courts, of course, may not invalidate legislation merely because it is preceived as unwise.
Here there is a transgression of a basic constitutional principle forbidding unequal and
special treatment for a class with no general
beneficient reason apparent.
(Emphasis added.)
(See also Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 355 N.E. 2d
903

(Ohio 1976), where the above language was adopted and the

compulsory arbitration requirement held violative of equal
protection guarantees.)
Even where such arbitration/pre-submission requirements
are upheld, it is clear that such are different from a presuit notice requirement which bears no relation to the purpose
of expediting evaluation and settlement of claims.

The

notice requirement is at best a procedural burden to plaintiffs and an automatic extension of time to the providersdefendants.
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Section 78-14-8, therefore, is unconstitutional as
it is arbitrary and without rational basis in differentiating
between plaintiffs in medical malpractice actions and plaintiffs in other types of professional malpractice and personal
injury actions; also, it is not reasonably related to the
purpose of the act as such is set forth by the legislature.
Therefore, "[T]here is no fair reason for the law,"
(Gronlund, supra.), and this Court should strike it down.
Like in Gronlund, supra., where the court found Sunday closing
ordinances constitutional but found that the classification of
what commodities could be sold on Sunday was arbitrary and
unconstitutional, the Court may here find that a pre-suit
notice requirement is constitutional but not where it applies
to groups of plaintiffs not rationally nor reasonably distinguishable from another group of plaintiffs.
POINT III
§78-14-8 VIOLATES ARTICLE VI, §26 OF THE CONSTITUTION
OF UTAH.
Article VI, §26 of the Constitution of Utah states:
No private or special law shall be enacted where
a general law can be applicable.
In the case of Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Company v.
Utah Insurance Guaranty Association, 564 P.2d 75 (Utah 1977),
this Court defined "special laws" and "general laws" as
follows:
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A general law applies to and operates uniformly
upon all members of any class of persons, places,
or things requiring legislation peculair to themselves in the matters covered by the laws in
question. On the other hand, special legislation
relates either to particular persons, places or
things or to persons, places or things which,
though not particularized, are separated by any
method of selection from the whole class to
which the law might, but for such legislation,
be applied.
In People v. Western Fruit Growers, [140 P.2d 13
(Cal. 1943)], the court stated a law is general
when it applies equally to all persons embraced
in a class founded upon some natural, intrinsic
or constitutional distinction.
It is special
legislation if it . . . imposes peculair disabilities, or burdensome conditions in the exercise of
a common right; upon a class of persons arbitrarily
selected, from the general body of those who stand
in precisely the same relation to the subject of
the law.
(Emphasis added.)
The notice requirement of §78-14-8 is a procedural
burden, a peculair disability, imposed upon plaintiffs in
medical malpractice actions.

As discussed in Point II

above, these plaintiffs constitute a class of plaintiffs
arbitrarily selected from the general body of professional
malpractice and personal injury plaintiffs.

All such plain-

tiffs stand in"precisely the same relation to the subject of
the law,"

the "subject of the law" being particularly pro-

fessional malpractice actions.

The notice statute is, there

fore, violative of Article VI §26 of the Constitution of Uta
POINT IV
THIS ACTION WAS TIMELY FILED PURSUANT TO THE
TERMS OF §78-12-40, UTAH CODE AHNOTATED, 1953,
AS AMENDED.
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The straightforward application of §78-12-40, the
Utah Saving Statute, results in Plaintiff-Appellant's action
being timely filed whether or not the notice requirement is
applicable hereto.
Section 78-12-40, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended,
provides:
If any action is commenced within due time and
a judgment thereon for the plaintiff is reversed,
or if the plaintiff fails in such action or upon
a cause of action otherwise than upon the merits,
and the time limited either by law or contract
for coI!U'!\encing the same shall have expired, the
plaintiff, or if he dies and the cause of action
survives, his representatives, may commence a
new action within one year after the reversal
or failure.
This provides for a one-year grace period to re-commence
an action if:

(1) there has been an original action commenced

within the period of the applicable statute of limitations;
(2) the original action is dismissed or fails otherwise than
on its merits; and (3) the original statute of limitations
period has expired since the commencing of the original action.
Section 78-14-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended,
provides in relevant part:
No malpractice action against a health care provider may be brought unless it is commenced
within two years after the plaintiff or patient
discovers, or through the use of reasonable
diligence should have discovered the injury,
whichever first occurs, but not to exceed four
years after the date of the alleged act, omission, neglect or occurrence
Plaintiff-Appellant entered the McKay-Dee Hospital
on or about April 15, 1975.

On or about April 18, 1975,

and thereafter, Plaintiff sustained injuries and damage
which were
proximately caused by the negligent acts and omisSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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sions of Defendants-Respondents.

(R.

3-5, 16, 28,

29)

Plain-

tiff, pursuant to the statute set forth above, had two years
to commence an action.

As he filed suit on April 18, 1977

(R.3, 16, 27), within the two-year limitation period, his
Complaint was timely.
Respondents will argue that as suit was filed after
the effective date (April 1, 1976) of the Health Care Malpractice Act, that he (Plaintiff) was subject to the notice
requirement contained in §78-14-8 of said act and could not
"commence" an action until he complied with the notice provision.

This has been thoroughly discussed in the preceding

portion of this brief.

Suffice it to say here that it is

Plaintiff-Appellant's position that the notice requirement
is not applicable.

However, even if it is held to be applic-

able, Plaintiff's action was timely "com.'1\enced."
The only Utah authority setting forth how an action
may be commenced is Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

In relevant part it provides:
A civil action is commenced (1) by filing a
complaint with the court, or (2) by the service
of a summons.

As Plaintiff filed a Complaint, he did commence an action.
If the notice requirement was applicable, which Plaintiff
submits it was not, it does not effect the fact that the
action had been commenced.

The action, however, may have

been subject to an order of dismissal or an order staying
prosecution.
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In any event, on April 18, 1977, Plaintiff's action
was corrunenced within due time.

However, on January 15,

1978, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed this action pursuant to
Rule 41(a) (1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

(R. 3,

16, 27)
This rule provides in pertinent part that an action may
be voluntarily dismissed by a Plaintiff without order of the
court "by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before
service by the adverse party of an answer or of a motion for
surrunary judgment • . • Unless otherwise stated in the notice
. . . the dismissal is without prejudice • .

Because

nothing had been served upon the Defendants, and none of them
had filed an answer or motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff's
Notice of Dismissal acted to dismiss his action without prejudice.

(R. 3, 16, 26, 27)
There is, therefore,

n~

question but that Plaintiff's

original action was timely commenced.

In addition, Utah case

law has expressly held that a voluntary dismissal by a plaintiff
without prejudice is a failure of action "otherwise than upon
the merits."

Luke v. Bennion, 36 Utah 61, 106 P. 712 U908);

Jones v. Jenkins, 22 F.2d 642 (1927).

Therefore, there is

also no question that Plaintiff's original action was dismissed
without prejudice for reasons other than on its merits.
Thirdly, for purposes of this portion of the argument, it will
be assumed that the original statute of limitations period had
expired.

Therefore, pursuant to §78-12-40 as set forth above,
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Plaintiff had one year from the date of dismissal, i.e.,
until January 14, 1979, to re-commence his action.

As this

was done on January 17, 1978, when he re-filed, he was again
time 1 y .

( R . 2 , 3 , 16 , 2 7 )
However, this second action, in March, 1978, was

erroneously dismissed "otherwise than upon the merits" when
the lower court, following its interpretation of this Court's
decision in Vealey,

dismissed the action without prejudice

to allow Plaintiff to give notice of intent to commence action
pursuant to §78-14-8.

(R. 2, 3, 16, 27)

Plaintiff did give

notice pursuant to said statute and re-commenced his action
on September 28, 1978.

(R. 1, 4, 6, 28)

It is upon this

third action that the present appeal is based.
Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment on this third
action were granted, the lower court having found that the
claim was barred by the Statute of Limitations.

(R. 83, 86, 87)

As set forth in the preceding discussion, this finding was
clearly in error as the action was timely by application of
78-12-40.

This is true even if the Court holds that the

noti~

requirement is applicable herein, as Plaintiff did fully comply
therewith prior to commencing this action.

(R. 4, 16, 28)

It should be noted that there is authority for holding
as the Oregon court did in White v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co.,
123 P.2d 193 (Ore. 1942), that the Oregon statute paralleling
U.C.A. §78-12-40 "applied only to the same cause of action
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. .

. for if the cause of action is a different cause of

action than that sued on in the former action, • • • the
bringing of said action would be expressly barred by statute."
In addition, 51 Arn. Jur. 2d, Limitation of Actions,
p. 820, §318 states:
As a general rule, a statute permitting commencement of a new action within a specified time
after failure of a prior action other than on
the merits is not applicable where the parties
in the new action are not the same as the ones
in the prior action. Thus, where an enabling
act permits a subsequent action after the limitation period where the first suit has failed, the
second suit must be substantially the same cause
of action and must be prosecuted by the same
plaintiff or his legal representatives against
all the defendants who were necessary parties
to the first suit or their legal representatives.
(Emphasis added.)
In this case, the only real difference in the original
and subsequent complaints filed by the Plaintiff is that Dr.
John Bender is named as a Defendant in the first Complaint
and is not named in either of the subsequent Complaints.
Otherwise, the Complaints deal with the same cause of action,
the same Plaintiff or his legal representative, and the subsequent actions are against all "defendants who were necessary
parties to the first suit."
In any event, no allegation has been made and no
defense raised by any of the Defendant-Respondents herein
where it is alleged that Dr. John Bender was a necessary party
to the first suit.

Furthermore, whether Dr. Bender was a

necessary party is a question of fact which, if properly
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raised by the Defendants, must be decided by a trial court-finder of fact.
Therefore, the Utah Saving Statute, U.C.A. §78-12-40,
is applicable here to establish that Plaintiff's action upon
which this appeal is based was timely filed.
POINT V
IF THERE Wl\S AN UNELAPSED PORTION OF THE LIMITATIONS PERIOD AS OF APRIL 1, 1976 FOR MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE ACTIONS ARISING PRIOR TO THAT DATE,
THE LAW REGARDING TP.E PERIOD OF LIMITATIONS THAT
EXISTED PRIOR TO SAID DATE WOULD BE CONTROLLING
BUT NOT TO EXTEND THE PERIOD BEYOHD MARCH 30,
1980.
Even if the notice requirement of §78-14-8 is construed
to be applied retroactively, Plaintiff's Complaint of September 28, 1978 would still have been timely.
The Health Care Malpractice Act provides in §78-14-4(2):
The provisions of this section shall apply to
all persons regardless of minority or other
legal disability (under §78-12-36 or any other
provision of the law) and shall apply retroactively to all persons, partnerships, associations and corporations and to all health care
providers and to all malpractice actions against
health care providers based upon alleged personal injuries which occurred prior to the
effective date of this act; provided, however,
that any action which under former law could
have been commenced after the effective date
of this act may be commenced only within the
unelapsed portion of the time allowed under
former law; but any action which under former law
could have been commenced more than four years
after the effective date of this act may be commenced only within four years after the effective
date of this act.
(Emphasis added; also, the
portions in parenthesis were added by the 1979
amendment.)
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The above clearly and unequivocally provides that the
provisions of §78-14-4 regarding the Statute of Limitations
are to apply regardless of legal disability, and that the
time limitations are to be applied retroactively.

It does

not state, however, that the provisions in that section are
to be applied retroactively to effect those with legal disabilities predating the act's effective date.

The applica-

bility of this section to those with legal disabilities and
the retroactivity of the time limits set forth in the section
are not necessarily related.

A careful analysis of the word-

ing of the section shows that just the opposite is true.
The clause (underlined above) following the first
semicolon of the above quoted provision is an express limitation on the preceding clause.

That this provision is to

apply regardless of legal disability and is to be applied
retroactively is set forth but is then limited by "provided,
however .

.

" that for actions not barred by the Statute of

Limitations on or before April 1, 1976, an "action which
under former law could have been commenced after the effective
date of this act," the period of limitation under former law
would be controlling.

This only, however, to the extent

there exists an unelapsed portion of time as measured by the
Statute of Limitations applicable prior to April 1, 1976.
This is further limited by the concluding clause to the
effect that the unelapsed portion of the limitations period
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under the former law would be controlling but not to extend
beyond four years from the effective date of the act.
Under former law, there was no provision abnegating
the applicability of Utah Code Annotated, 1953, §78-12-36,
as amended, to malpractice actions.

Said section provides

in pertinent part:
If a person entitled to bring an action, other
than for the recovery of real property, is at
the time the cause of action accrued, either:
(2) Mentally incorapetent and without a
legal guardian; or . • . the time of such
disability is not a part of the time limited
for the commencement of the action.
Since Plaintiff-Appellant was mentally incompetent
at the time his cause of action accrued, which was before
the effective date of the Health Care Act, and has continued
under this disability ever since said time

(~.

9-13, 93, 94);

and since under former law a disability effectively tolled
the running of the Statute of Liraitations even in malpractice
actions, no part of the time that passed from the date his
cause of action accrued until the effective date of the act
is a "part of the time limited for the commencement of the
action."
That is, as of April 1, 1976, no time had run against
Plaintiff-Appellant on the applicable Statute of Limitations
as the statute had been effectively tolled by his disability.
Plaintiff-Appellant, by the terms of the last clause of
§78-14-4(2), had until March 30, 1980, four years from the
effective date of the act, to commence his action.

This
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being true, this cause of action which was commenced on
September 28, 1978, was timely filed.

(R. 2)

This is true

even if the Court rejects all of Plaintiff-Appellant's arguments against the retroactive application of the notice provision, as he fully and timely complied therewith before
commencing this action.

(R. 4, 16, 28)
CONCLUSION

The 1979 Amendments to the Utah Health Care Malpractice
Act are determinative of the issue of the retroactivity of
the notice requirement of §78-14-8.

As shown by these amend-

ments and by careful analysis of the original statute, it is
clear that the legislature's intent was and is that this
section not be applied retroactively.

Vealey, supra. should

be overruled or clarified to conform herewith.
Even if this were not true, §78-14-8 violates the equal
protection clause of the United States Constitution and
Article I §24 and Article VI §26 of the Constitution of Utah.
It is, therefore, void and unenforceable.
Finally, pursuant to the application of §78-12-40, the
Utah Saving Statute, Plaintiff's action of September 28, 1978
was timely.

However, even if the Court were to reject appli-

cation of the saving statute, Plaintiff's September 28, 1978
action was timely pursuant to the terms of §78-14-4(2) and
the fact that Plaintiff has suffered a legal disability from
the time his cause of action arose, which was before the
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effective date of the act.

In addition, were the Court to

reject all of Plaintiff-Appellant's arguments with respect
to the retroactivity or unconstitutionality of §78-14-8,
such notice requirement was complied with by Plaintiff prior
to filing his action on September 28, 1978.
This action, therefore, should be remanded for trial
on its merits.

(_

DATED this /K_day of May, 1979.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED

A. Hurst
RS EN, ORTON & LILJENQUIST
A~
rneys for PlaintiffAppellant
68 South Main, Fifth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

Mailed a copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFAPPELLANT ZEBLEN V. WHITE, et al., to Dan S. Bushnell and
Larry R. White, Kirton, McConkie, Boyer & Boyle, 330 South
Third East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, and to R. M. Child,
Bayle, Child & Ritchie, 1105
Lake City, Utah 84101, this

Con~nental

~day

Bank Building, Salt

of May, 1979, postage

prepaid.
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